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THE MODERN BLOOD
FEUD: THOUGHTS ON
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
TERRORISM
CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY*
All that most maddens and torments; all that stirs up the lees of things; all
truth with malice in it; all that cracks the sinews and cakes the brain; all the
subtle demonisms of life and thought; all evil to crazy Ahab, were visibly
personified, and made practically assailable in Moby Dick. He piled upon
the whale's white hump the sum of all the general rage and hate felt by his
whole race from Adam down; and then, as if his chest had been a mortar, he
burst his hot heart's shell upon it. H. MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 160 (Hayford &
Parker eds. 1967).
I. INTRODUCTION
Herman Melville brilliantly lets us feel, through Captain Ahab, the
sensation of destructive rage, hatred and violence. Sadly, Melville's in-
sight penetrates to the core of society, perhaps of each of us, in today's
omnipresent terroristic melodrama. We have all suffered moments of vi-
carious terror and rage over the past few years as we watched news ac-
counts of terrorist incidents, such as the downing of Pan Am Flight 103
* Christopher L. Blakesley, is a Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law Center.
He received his B.A. from the University of Utah, his M.A. from the Fletcher School ofInternational Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, his J.D. from the University of Utah,
his LL.M from Columbia University, and his J.S.D. from Columbia University. He teaches
public international law, international and comparative criminal law, comparative familylaw, as well as domestic criminal law and family law. Prior to entering academia, he was
Attorney Adviser in the Office of the Legal Adviser, the United States Department of State.
He has written extensively in his fields of expertise, including a four volume treatise in
family law, and over thirty major articles in law reviews or chapters in books, both in the
United States and Europe. He has also taught at the University of the Pacific, the Univer-
sity of Utah, and has taught courses in Salzburg, Austria and Budapest, Hungary, where he
team taught comparative criminal law and procedure with Dr. Arpad Erdei, of Etvos Lor-
rand University, Budapest. This article is drawn from author's forthcoming book, TERROR-
ISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PROTECTING CIVIL LIBERTIES (Transnat'l Pub. Inc. 1990).
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over Lockerbie, Scotland. The melodrama of terrorism has penetrated
each of our lives. We see it and feel the rage nearly on a daily basis.
Innocent children, women and men aboard Pan Am Flight 103 were used
as fodder in some "war" or other. Perhaps the pusillanimous carnage was
in retaliation for the slaughter of innocent children, women and men
aboard the Iranian Air Bus, blown out of the sky by American forces last
year.' Or perhaps it was committed by those interested in thwarting pros-
pects of peace in the Middle East.
Terroristic outrage is sickeningly common. Chemical warfare has re-
cently been reinstituted against combatants and noncombatants alike.
Evidence indicates that on or about March 23, 1988, the Iraqui Air Force
bombed villages in Kurdistan, spreading mustard and possibly nerve gas
over villagers, dropping them in their panicked tracks, many holding their
babies to their breasts.2 Iraq has accused Iran of using similar weapons.'
Libya is said to have nearly completed construction of a chemical weap-
' Was United States Captain Will Rogers of the warship VII Vincennes, which shot down
the Airbus, or were his superiors informed, or were they grossly negligent not to have been
informed, that "bellicose rhetoric is not a good indication of actual intent in the Middle
East?" Rubin, Payment Precedents in the Gulf Affair, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 21,
1988, at 13. Did they know that Iran had very good military reasons for not attacking a
United States war vessel by air, and that Iran, indeed, had carefully avoided doing so? Were
they aware that it was actually Iraq that had attacked United States ships in this manner;
that it was in Iraq's interest, not Iran's, to provoke the United States? Professor Alfred
Rubin notes some of these deficiencies in the United States explanation of the slaughter of
those 290 souls, and suggests a tort rationale and settlement ex gratia to satisfy "Iran's and
the world's gut feeling that America must be wrong." Id. I would submit that although the
tort model is appropriate and that compensation ought to be forthcoming, criminal action
should not be ruled out. If the evidence is such that the killing of those innocent people was
done intentionally or in a grossly reckless (wanton) fashion, mass murder has been commit-
ted. If both sides were grossly reckless, perhaps both are responsible. Naval Commander,
David R. Carlson, Commander of the U.S.S Sides, a frigate on the scene when the Vin-
cennes shot down the Iranian Aribus, in Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute magazine, said
that the Vincennes, nicknamed Robo Cruiser had "no good reason" for downing the Iranian
Airbus. He noted, further, "[tlhe Vincennes saw an opportunity for action, and pressed hard
for Commander Middle East Force to give permission to fire.... The tragedy was avoidable,
and we must learn from it. ... When the decision was made to shoot down the Airbus, the
airliner was climbing, not diving; it was showing the proper identification friend or foe....
The Vincennes was never under attack by the Iranian aircraft." Brennan, Iran Air Tragedy
Was Avoidable, Officer Says, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sept. 2, 1989, at 9A, col. 1.
2 CNN Network News, on March 24, 1988, showed videotape of the grotesque slaughter.
World Report, (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 3, 1988); see also Iraq Threatens Chemical
Warfare on Iran, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 30, 1988, at 9A, col. 1 (report of
bombing). Now Iraq has threatened to use them on Israel.
3 Iraq Threatens Chemical Warfare on Iran, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, March 30,
1988, at 9A, col. 1; Smolowe, Return of the Silent Killer, TIME, Aug. 22, 1988, at 46; Smo-
lowe, Where is the Outrage?, TIME, Sept. 26, 1988, at 36.
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ons manufacturing facility.4 It has been proposed that the United States
Government increase its capacity to research biological agents for use as
weapons or defenses. 5 The Salvadoran Army has reconstituted, after a hi-
atus, its program of mass execution of civilians to intimidate "its ene-
mies."'6 In September 1982, innocent men, women and children were
slaughtered in the refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila, Lebanon by Leba-
nese-Christian forces dependent on Israel. 7 The Achille Lauro Affair is
well known.' The Soviets, among other things, are alleged to have used
booby-trapped dolls for Afghan Moujahadeen children.9 The outrage of
the desaparacidos is now well known. 10 The United States Government
has supported, both directly and indirectly, the Nicaraguan "Contras",
who allegedly have killed innocent Americans and Nicaraguans by their
guerilla warfare. 1 Sandinistas too have allegedly killed innocents in the
effort to maintain their power. 2 The depredations that occurred in
' Les Armes Chimiques en Proces: Relance de Negociations par MM. Reagan et Mitter-
rand, Le Monde, Selection Hebdomadaire, Sept. 22-28, 1988, at 1, col. 2 (Ed. Internatio-
nale); La Position Francaise, id., at 3, cols. 1 and 2.
E. FIRMAGE, THE ENEMY, TESTIMONY GIVEN BEFORE THE UNITED STATES ARMY HEARINGS(Tooele, Utah, Sept. 19, 1988) (copy available at the University of Utah College of Law and
at the offices of the University of Colorado Law Review).
' See Salvador: Dix Paysans Tues Pres de la Capitale: l'Armee Reprend ses Executions
Collectives, Le Monde, Sept. 22-28, 1988, at 2, cola. 2-5 (Ed. Internationale). The articles
describe the execution of seven men and three women, aged twenty to sixty years, dressed
like poor farmers ready to work in the fields. The soldiers gathered some forty poor farmers
to a school, claiming they wanted to advise them of the situation in the region. Once at the
school, the soldiers accused them of collaborating with the guerrillas. They blindfolded and
took ten of them from the schoolhouse and executed them less than a kilometer from the
school.
L.C. GREEN, War Crimes, Extradition and Command Responsibility, in ESSAYS ON THE
MODERN LAW OF WAR 228-37 (1985).
' See, "We Want Justice," Reagan Declares, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
" See SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR 1984, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.,1159-69 (Joint Comm. Print
1985) (State Department report presenting the atrocities and abuses of human rights com-
mitted in Afghanistan by the Soviet-backed regime); INDEPENDENT COUNSEL ON INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN AFGANISTAN (Nov. 18,
1987).
" See Lippman, Disappearances: Towards a Declaration on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 4 CONN J. INT'L L. 121, 122,
124 (1988) (citing NUNCA MAs: THE REPORT OF THE AREGENTINE NAT'L COMM'N ON THE DIS-
APPEARED (1986)); TORTURE IN BRAZIL: A REPORT BY THE ARCHDIOCESE OF SAO PAULO 204 (J.
Wright trans. 1986); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, DISAPPEARED PRISONERS IN CHILE 16-17 (1977);
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF THE AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO ARGENTINA 6-
15 (1975).
13 See, e.g., Sancez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lobel, The Constitu-
tion Abroad, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 871 (1989); Neier, There's a Contra-diction, Sacramento Bee,
Apr. 5, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
2 Neier, supra note 11, at 1, col. 6.
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Kampuchea are renown.13 The South African Government terrorizes and
oppresses the non-white population within its territory.14 There are many,
many others, tragic episodes that continue the ugly saga of terrorism, 5
our nauseating modern equivalent of the ancient bloodfeud.
II. RESPONSE: RAGE, OVERREACTION AND THE CREATION OF THE SECURITY
STATE
Our tendency is to turn our fright into rage then to seek vengeance.
Virtually every group in the world suffers from this fear, rage and desire
for vengeance. The result is our participation together in an ugly death
dance, as Albert Camus put it. We are, indeed, caught in an infernal dia-
lectic. Our horror and rage are easily translated into vengeance by leaders
having selfish interests or confused outlooks.
The domestic and international legal response to terrorism is confu-
sion or anti-terrorism that amounts to terrorism itself, combined with
obfuscation. Governments often overreact to the threat of terrorism,
abusing their peoples' fears about its dangers in order to accomplish self-
ish foreign or domestic policy goals. Some have even exploited these fears
to bolster their own acts of criminal terrorism. The tactic crystallized for
American policy early in the cold war era. A special Report of Covert
Operations commissioned by President Eisenhower has been adopted as
hallowed American policy: "Another important requirement is an aggres-
" See KAMPUCHEA: DECADE OF THE GENOCIDE (K. Kiljunen ed. 1984) (report of Finnish In-
quiry Commission); Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN J. INT'L. L. 547, 550-53 (1987)
("campaign of wholesale genocide"); Stanton, Kampuchean Genocide and the World Court,
2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 341 (1987) ("Kampuchea was turned into a vast concentration camp").
14 See Dugard, The Judiciary in a State of National Crisis- With Special Reference to the
South African Experience, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 477, 486-87 (1987).
"6 When United States fighter pilots intercepted an Egyptian jetliner carrying the hijackers
of the Achille Lauro, who were later convicted in Italy (N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col.
6), the pilots themselves either committed kidnapping or hijacking or were able to claim
justification. The only justifications could be that the Egyptian pilot or his government con-
sented, or that the pilot or his government were participating in the attempted escape. See
McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implications for International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV.
691 (1985).
The compelling policy reasons that a country may have for committing an illegal act
cannot amount to a legal justification. As one court has explained:
[T]here is no discretion to commit or to have one's officers or agents commit, an
illegal act . . . .Whatever policy options may exist for a foreign country, it has no
"discretion" to perpetrate conduct designed to result in the assasination of an indi-
vidual or individuals, action that is clearly contrary to the precepts of humanity as
recognized in both national and international law.
Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 673 (D.D.C. 1980); see Singer, Terrorism, Extra-
dition, and FSIA Relief: The Letelier Case, 19 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 57, 69 (1986).
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sive covert psychological, political and paramilitary organization more ef-
fective . ..and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the
enemy .... There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms
of human conduct do not apply."16 One must be careful not to become a
terrorist to fight terrorism or an oppressor to overcome oppression.
Professor Richard Falk is correct in noting that there is currently a
symbiotic relationship between the leaders of terrorist groups and the
leaders of regimes fighting against these groups. 7 Both sides tend to use
law as exhortation, to summon public support for the use of force where
the victim of that force can be associated with terrorism.'8 There exists a
melodramatic tendency in leaders of every side to blind their adherents to
any humanity on the other side. Each wants his own to believe they are
fightingthe devil himself. Each wants his adherents to believe that all
truth rests with him and is being destroyed by the enemy. This mindset
facilitates the use of unrestrained violence. Law and morality are seen as
tools to promote power, but, sadly, their restraining power is thrown
aside. This damns us all to a world devoid of law and morality to a world
where law and morality are brute power.'9
Alexander Haig recently manifested this dangerous attitude when he
noted, "[t]he . . . flaw is that we have tended thus far to believe that a
counteraction that endangers innocent lives dirties our hands. That
places the terrorist on the same moral plane as the victim ...."o General
Haig is wrong! Forgoing counteraction that endangers innocent life does
not place the terrorist on the same moral plane as the victim. It is the
innocent lives that are set on the same moral plane. Innocent victims are
on equal footing, no matter what ideology or motive is used to rationalize
their slaughter. Notwithstanding the views of General Haig, we do not
want to become counter-terrorists who are willing to kill innocents to get
back at terrorists. Killers of innocents place themselves on equal footing
with other such killers. The hundred plus innocents killed in Tripoli, in-
cluding Quadaffi's infant daughter are on an equal footing with Leon
Klinghoffer. All of their deaths are reprehensible.
' Firmage, Rogue Presidents and the War Power of Congress, 11 GEO. MASON U. L. REV.
79, 89 (1988) (citing REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY GROUP ON THE COVERT ACTIVITIES OF THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (the "Doolittle Report") (Sept. 30, 1954) (declassified April
1, 1976)).
" R. FALK, REVOLUTIONARIES AND FUNCTIONARIES: THE DUAL FACE OF TERRORISM 54 (1988).
18 Id. at 144. This tactic is misguided if we wish law and moderation to have a place in
society. Our government and many commentators use the label "terrorist" against moder-
ates and actually eviscerate the moderates' bargaining power within their own group. Thus,
we allow the terrorist arm of revolutionary groups to maintain power. Id. at 52-54, 140-44.
19 Id.
"0 Friedlander, When Will the Madness End?, 18 TOLEDO L. REV. 125, 130 (1986) (footnote
ommitted).
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Using terrorism as a justification for the arrogation of executive
power is not unique to the United States. Indeed, it is the typical re-
sponse by governments around the world.
A. Examples
1. Great Britain
It appears that the Reagan Administration took its lead from Great
Britain, which, despite having a great tradition in the development of
civil liberties, may have been backsliding, at least with regard to security
problems in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, even the judiciary
has become very "executive minded." For example, the courts have
seemed willing not only to admit the unconfirmed, verbal confessions that
alleged Irish Republican Army members or their sympathizers give police
during intensive interrogation, but also "to absolve security forces from
responsibility for lethal use of force."'" This erosion of civil liberty may
stem from a general malaise caused by the local strife and an executive
mindedness illustrated by Lord Pearson in McEldowney v. Forde,22 where
Pearson declared that the Minister of Home Affairs is the one who ought
to make regulations "for the preservation of the peace and maintenance
of order":
The Northern Irelancd Parliament must have intended that somebody
should decide whether or not the making of some proposed regulation
would be conducive to the 'preservation of the peace and the maintenance
of order.' Obviously it must have been intended that the Minister of Home
Affairs should decide that question. Who else could? ... The courts cannot
have been intended to decide such a question, because they do not have the
necessary information and the decision is in the sphere of politics, which is
not their sphere.2"
The backsliding in civil liberties has accellerated, with the promulgation
of a ban on reporting statements of individuals with certain "terroristic"
backgrounds and the abrogation of the three-hundred year old right not
to incriminate oneself. One cannot yet be forced to speak, but her silence
may be used against her. Lord Pearson's statement sounds like the rheto-
ric of the Legal Adviser to the United States Department of State regard-
2 Dugard, surpa note 14, at 482; see K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, TEN YEARS ON IN
NORTHERN IRELAND 76-77, 86 (1980); K. BOYLE, T. HADDEN & P. HILLYARD, LAW AND STATE:
THE CASE OF NORTHERN IRELAND 102-03 (1975); see also Abramovsky, The Political Offence
Exception and the Extradition Process: The Enhancement of the Role of the U.S. Judici-
ary, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1, 6 (1989) ("Traditional rights and safeguards
granted to 'ordinary' criminal defendants are denied to suspected terrorists").
22 See Dugard, supra note 14, at 482 (discussion of McEldowney).
23 Id. (footnote omitted).
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ing the U.S.-U.K. Treaty.2 ' The trend in programs and policy of the
Reagan Administration also was in the direction of eliminating civil liber-
ties, if the elimination could be sold as a means to combat crime or ter-
rorism. If that trend continues it will lead to additional serious infringe-
ments. One must hope that it can be thwarted before it goes as far as in
the United Kingdom.
2. South Africa
Another even more ominous similarity is found in South Africa,
where the parliament and the judiciary have become so obsessed with se-
curity, anti-communism and preservation of the status quo that even
many of those who are opposed to apartheid have been co-opted. The evil
of apartheid has been maintained through laws passed in the name of
security. For example, in addition to the "Group Areas Act,"25 the SouthAfrican legislature has "legalized" lengthy detention without trial for the
purpose of interrogation.26
In addition, the South African judiciary has at least acquiesced, in-
deed has expanded upon, the executive's authority to "protect against
terrorism," in a manner that has eviscerated civil rights and liberties.2 7
For example, detainees have been denied reading and writing materials
because such materials relieve "tedium" and "negative the inducement to
speak," thereby depriving the government of more information on other
2 See 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1104-09 (1985). The U.S.-U.K. treaty, known as the Sup-
plementary Treaty, considerably limits the application of the political offence exception to
the 1972 Extradition Treaty. For evaluation in support of the political offence exception, see
Sofaer, The Political Offence Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 125(1986) and Lubet, Extradition Unbound: A Reply to Professors Blakesley and Bassiooui, 24
TEX. I. L.J. 47 (1989). For a critical evaluation, see Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Politi-
cal Offence Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 109, 109-24 (1986), Bas-
siouni, The "Political Offence Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S. and the
U.K-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law and Policy,
15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 255, 255-82 (1986) and A. ABRAMOVSKY, supra note 21.
25 Group Areas Act 36 of 1966 replaced and consolidated the provisions of Group Act 41 of1950 and Group Areas Act 77 of 1957. See Dugard, supra note 14, at 489 n.1. "The GroupAreas Act is one of the main pillars of apartheid as it authorizes the executive to establish
separate residential and business areas for the different racial groups." Id. at 489 (footnote
omitted).
2 In 1965 the period of detention was extended to 180 days, and today indefinite detentionis authorized. Dugard, supra note 14, at 490. The most recent changes to the Act permit any
commissioned officer, without a warrant, to arrest any person he believes has committed orintended to commit or has information relating to the commission of an offence. See id.
"7 See Dugard, supra note 14, at 484-98 (discussing judicial behaviour in promulgating
apartheid in South Africa). But see Comment, What Role Can South African Judges Playin Mitigating Apartheid? A Study of the Urban African Legal Regime, 1987 Wis. L. REV.
325, 325-61 (analyzing four cases in which South African Judiciary exercized its interpretive
power to abate severity of statutory provisions).
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"terrorists. '28 The South African Judiciary even stopped exercising its
long-honored powers over the admission of confessions obtained by abu-
sive means. 29 Moreover, the contempt of court conviction of an anti-
apartheid law professor was upheld on appeal on the ground that he
called for the courts to "adopt a more activist approach to the interpreta-
tion of the security laws in order to curb police torture.3
Needless to say, a climate of violence and repression has grown as
security forces have been given a free hand. Widespread anxiety about
terrorism and communism, as well as racist sentiment, have been used by
the government in South Africa effectively to eliminate what had been an
independent judiciary from playing its role as protector of civil liberty.
3. Israel
Professor Pnina Lahav's eloquent account of the tragic Shin Bet af-
fair in Israel presents the classic denouement: 1 (1) the peoples' constant
suffering under murderous terrorism; (2) "the resort to murder as a
counter-terrorist method"; (3) "the use of censorship to shield the
method from the public eye"; (4) "once censorship [has] failed, the cover-
up of the affair to shield illegality from the institutions of law enforce-
ment"; (5) "the President's pardon, which extended to agents of the se-
cret police for both the murder and the cover-up, and which was chal-
lenged before and sustained by the High Court of justice; (6) the
acquiescence or connivance of the judiciary with the security minded tac-
tics at the expense of the due process system. The secret police gain as-
cendancy and eventually society "relaxes its demand" that police be ac-
countable for their actions."
B. Symbiotic Relationship Between Terrorists and Counter-Terrorists
There seems to be a paradoxical, symbiotic relationship among the
28 See Dugard, supra note 14, at 490 (citing Roussouw v. Sachs, 1964 (2) S.A. 551(A)).
29 See id. at 490-92.
30 Id. at 491 (citing S. v. Van Niekerk, 1972(3) S.A. 711(A)); see also J. DUGARD, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL ORDER 290-302 (1978)(discussing Van Niekerk).
31 See Lahav, A Barrel Without Hoops: The Impact of Counterterrorism on Israel's Legal
Culture, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 529 (1988). The Shin Bet Affair refers to the incident in which
terrorists hijacked what became known as Bus #300. Israel Defense Forces eventually
stormed Bus #300 and liberated the hostages, killing two of the terrorists. The remaining
two terrorists were led off the bus and handed over to Shin Bet for interrogation. The hi-
jackers were interrogated and severely beaten by Shin Bet agents and, finally, "executed
pursuant to an order by the head of the Shin Bet." Id. at 531-32.
12 Id., at 529-536. Professor Lahav asks the poignant question in relation to Israel that may
be generalized as fundamental for us all: "to what extent may the Children of Abraham
partake in the practices of Sodom and Gomorrah before Israel becomes a Sodom or Gomor-
rah?" Id. at 532.
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leaders of terrorist groups and leaders of regimes fighting against thosegroups. 33 Even law has been perverted or appropriated by each as a toolfor terrorism." All camps want to blind their adherents to any humanity
on the other side. Each side wants its people to believe they are fighting
the devil himself; that all truth rests with them and is being destroyed bythe enemy.35 This tactic allows the use of unrestrained violence. All
camps tend to pervert law and use it as exhortation to summon public
support for the use of force, provided the person against whom the forceis applied can be associated with the evil of the other side terrorism.3 6Thus, law and morality are mocked; they are cynically seen as tools topromote one's own power. Sadly, their restraining power is thrown aside.This damns us all to a world devoid of law and morality to a world where
the only "law" and the only "morality" are brute power.3' This is not thebrightest tactic in the world, if we wish law and moderation to have a
place.
Government, media and most commcitators today, use the label
"terrorist" in a propagandistic fashion. It is applied to anyone in the "en-
emy" camp. It is applied to moderates and actually eviscerates those
moderates' bargaining power within their own group, allowing the terror-ist arm of revolutionary groups to maintain power.3 8 Leaders of revolu-
tionary groups tend to do the same.
III. WHY WE HAVE TERRORISM: A PLAGUE-AN INFERNAL DIALECTIC
Sadly, today, apologists in every camp, including our own and those
of our real or perceived enemies, are unable to justify aggressive conduct
that, if it were perpetrated against the aggressors, would be considered bythem criminal. We all seem to be caught up, as Albert Camus said, in
some "infernal dialectic that whatever kills one side kills the other too,
each blaming the other and justifying his violence by the opponent's vio-lence. The eternal question as to who was first responsible loses all mean-ing then ... [W]e can at least . . . refrain from what makes it unforgiv-
able-the murder of the innocent."3 I trust that Albert Camus was right,however, in his belief that humanity generally does not want to be victim
" R. FALK, supra note 17, at 54, 84-87, 93.
", Id. at 140.
35 Id.
36 Id.
" Id. at 82-87, 140-44.
"' Id. at 52-54, 140-44.
" A. CAMUS, Appeal for a Civilian Truce in Algeria, in RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH101-02 (1960). "[Even] [i]f murder is in the nature of man, the law is not intended toreproduce that nature." A. CAMUS, Reflections on the Guillotine, in id., at 198.
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or executioner.40 When we participate in or accept oppression or the
slaughter of innocents, however, no matter how lofty the articulated end,
we simply become oppressors or slaughterers of innocents.
Notwithstanding all our attempts to make it appear acceptable
through obfuscation, secrecy and rhetoric, we must come to realize that
we are participating in a "miasma of evil" and that we are deluded by
"[t]he self-assurance of those who know all the answers in advance and
who are convinced of their own absolute and infallible correctness [which]
sets the stage for war, pestilence, famine, and other personages we prefer
to leave unnoticed in the pages of an apocalypse."4 This ignorance which
Camus and Merton reject "prefers its own rightness to the values that are
worth defending. Indeed it sacrifices those values by its willingness to kill
men in honor of its dogmatic self-idolatry.""2 "As long as one is content to
justify one's existence by reference to these automatically accepted
norms, one is in complicity with the absurd, with a murderous society,
with death, with 'the Plague.'""
A. All Sides Caught in the Infernal Dialectic or the Plague Mentality
Unfortunately, we are all caught-up in this "infernal dialectic," this
horrible "death-dance," this "Plague" which is a propensity to pestilence
and destruction that we try to hide. Thomas Merton, analyzing Camus'
The Plague, states the tendency beautifully:
It is the willful negation of life that is built into life itself: the human in-
stinct to dominate and to destroy to seek one's own happiness by destroying
40 See Friedlander, Terrorism and National Liberation Movements: Can Rights Derive
From Wrongs?, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 281, 282, n. 3. But in this, we must still try to
overcome, by rectifying wrongs done in the past or currently being perpetrated, the ten-
dency to allow inertia to make executioners or victims of us all.
Consider also, the view of Thomas Merton:
Man's drive to destroy, to kill, or simply to dominate and to oppress comes from the
metaphysical void he experiences when he finds himself a stranger in his own uni-
verse. He seeks to make that universe familiar to himself by using it for his own ends,
but his own ends are capricious and ambivalent. They may be life-affirming, they may
be expressions of comprehension and of love, or they may be life-denying, armored in
legalism and false theology, or perhaps even speaking the naked language of brute
power. In any case, the message of Camus is that man cannot successfully seek the
explanation of his existence in abstractions: instead of trying to justify his life in
terms of abstract formulas, man must create meaning in his existence by living in a
meaningful way.
T. MERTON, The Plague of Albert Camus: A Commentary and Introduction, THE LITERARY
ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 181-83 (1981).
" T. MERTON, supra note 39, at 199. See Generally A. CAMUS, L'HOMME REVOLTh
(1954)(describing the concept of revolution as justification for mass murder).
42 T. MERTON, supra note 39, at 195.
13 Id. at 198.
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the happiness of others, to build one's security on power and, by extension,
to justify evil use of that power in terms of "history," or of "the common
good," or of "the revolution," or even of "the justice of God.""
It is easy to slip into Camus' infernal dialectic to participate in his
"death-dance" and to be overcome by the "Plague." From the perspective
of those who are oppressed, it is easy to believe that all law, including
that prohibiting violence against innocents, works to continue the oppres-
sion. Indeed, what is claimed to be law by many actually does oppress.
Jean-Paul Sartre put the argument well:
A fine sight they are too, the believers in non-violence, saying that they are
neither executioners nor victims. Very well then; if you're not a victim when
the government which you've voted for, when the army in which your
younger brothers are serving without hesitation or remorse have undertaken
race murder, you are, without a shadow of doubt, executioners .... Try to
understand this at any rate: if violence began this very evening and if ex-
ploitation and oppression had never existed on the earth, perhaps the slo-
gans of non-violence might end the quarrel. But if the whole regime, even
your non-violent ideas, are conditioned by a thousand year-old oppression,
your passivity serves only to place you in the ranks of the oppressors.'
Thus, the oppressed perceive international law as fostering and pro-
moting their oppression.4 They argue, accurately, that the oppression is a
form of violence against innocents-themselves. The violence and oppres-
sion against them that began ages ago continues to date, so they are de-
termined to strike-out with similar violence against the oppressors
through those who will inherit the fruits of the oppression. Alternatively,
they argue that since the rules of today's international society foster op-
pression-terror-violence against the oppressed-the oppressed are not
bound to obey the rules that work against them. As a means to break the
yoke of oppression and terror, the oppressed or their leadership some-
times opt for violence. Why, argue the oppressed, should we abide by
rules that provide for others at our expense; that function to oppress and
to do violence to us? Children of the oppressors can be seen as enemies,
as they will inherit the fruit of oppression. Violence is justified under cer-
tain circumstances, but should never be applied to noncombatants or
their equivalents (innocents) as a means to break the yoke of oppression,
to maintain the status quo, or to promote "democracy."
It is true that those of us who sit by and allow, affirm, or even acqui-
" Id. at 181.
" Sartre, Preface to F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH at 21 (1963).
" Some oppressing nations justify their conduct by claiming that it is consistent with inter-
national law. Others simply suggest by their actions and their cynical excuses that there is
no international law. But the reality is that oppression violates international law, no matter
what the excuse given and regardless of whether some nations "get away with it" for a time.
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esce to the oppression or who allow international law to be its tool, are,
no doubt, on the side of oppression and terrorism. If we behave in this
manner, we are on the side of the executioners; we have succumbed to the
"Plague" and are no different from those who allow or affirm killing of
innocents. Sartre was wrong, however, to suggest that violence against
noncombatants is justified. Revolution and "freedom fighting" are often
"facile justification[s] of mass murder."' 7 Camus was correct to reject
both the Sartiran ethic that finds virtue in slaughtering innocents for a
just cause and the nihilism which "negates all virtue in order to dedicate
itself to revolutionary action. '48 Sartre was also wrong to suggest that we
all are terrorists on one side, if we are not terrorists on the other. One can
defend and protect the innocents of the world without killing other
innocents.
However valid the arguments of the oppressed in today's world, any
violence that they direct against noncombatants or innocents is criminal.
Moreover, they should realize that usually such violence allows the op-
pressors to feel justified in their oppression, or at least to sell to their
constituents the view that the use of violence in maintaining their power
is valid. When innocent civilians are attacked by those claiming to re-
present the oppressed, the constituents of the oppressing governmental
power side with the government. The government, feeling the support of
its people, tends to increase its own oppression in order to quash the
counter-violence. Oppression and counter-violence increase, rather than
decrease, in a frightening cycle.
But we do need to be on the side of the victims. We must refuse to
affirm the oppression of terrorism. We must oppose the leaders of the
world who function as executioners or oppressors. Otherwise, we are all
executioners. Terrorism pervades our world culture; we participate in ter-
rorism when we passively allow our government or group leaders to com-
mit it or to bolster regimes or groups that commit it."
B. Modern Blood-Feud: A Plague For Fundamentalist Zealots and
"Realists" Alike
We seem to have slipped quite easily into the ancient mentality of
the blood feud. Lex talionis, "an eye for an eye,'5° calls for the victims or
the victims' proxies to carry out the sanction against the victimizers. Re-
" T. MERTON, supra note 39, at 199. See generally A. CAMUS, L'HOMME REVOLTE
(1954)(describing the concept of revolution as justification for mass murder).
" T. MERTON, supra note 39, at 199.
See, C. BLAKESLEY, Terrorism and the Constitution, 27 B.Y.U. STUDIES 198 (1987); R.
FALK, supra note 17, at 71.
"0 Exodus 21:24; see Dinstein, International Law as a Primitive Legal System, 19 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1, 11 (1986).
HeinOnline -- 33 Cath. Law. 188 1990
PHILOSOPHY OF TERRORISM
taliation is aimed at the collectivity of the actual or perceived oppressors.
Any member of that group is the enemy. The history of lex talionis is
interesting and may provide important insight into the modern "need" to
retaliate. In ancient times, the tribe or group would hold certain conduct
to be punishable and to require vengeance. When this conduct occurred,
the society was required to purge itself of the crime's taint so that the
wrath of the god or gods would be avoided. The metaphysical dangers
sometimes could be avoided only through spilling the blood of the perpe-
trator or his proxy.5 ' When a person who had committed an act that put
the group at metaphysical risk escaped, the group had to seek that per-
son's return to expiate itself. If the person's return was not possible, the
group had to purge the taint by proxy, often through attack and slaughter
of those who represented the fugitive." Still today, oppression or per-
ceived oppression by one group against another is the impetus for retalia-
tion by the oppressed against the oppressors, resulting in counter-retalia-
tion by the original oppressors. Any member of the opposing group (call it
the family, clan, tribe, people, or nation-state) is fairly subject to retalia-
tion. The retaliator is not viewed by his or her own group as a criminal or
a terrorist because he or she is an instrument of the group's need to
avenge itself. Once this occurs, the other group feels justified in a
counter-reprisal and the vendetta rages.5
IV. UNDERPINNINGS: TERROR IN THE FRENCH MIDDLE AGES AND THE
REVOLUTION
Adversaries in modern conflicts, those seeking to maintain the status
quo and those trying to destroy it, seem to apply power in the same man-
ner as the theoreticians and technicians of punishment in the French
51 See, e.g., 1 Kings 2:28-34; Code of Manu, Bk. VII, 18, 23-24, Bk. VIII, 17. On the notion
of purging the taint in the context of the Hindu Code, or Laws of Manu and the like, see
generally K. LLEWELLYN & E. HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT AND CASE LAW INPRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 16-17, 358 (1878); S. SINHA, Asy-
LUM AND INT'L LAW 6 (1971); and R. Fairbanks, A Discussion of the Nation State Status ofAmerican Indian Tribes: A Case Study of the Cheyenne Nation 31 (LL.M. thesis available
in Columbia Law School Library). Intratribal murder, for example, "required the keeper of
the arrows to cleanse the tribe of the spectre of death." Id. Expiation, rest and happiness for
the sinner as well as the society had to be obtained through the soul-purging punishment of
the Wrongdoer or his proxy. CODE OF MANU, Bk. VII: 18: 23-24; bk VIII; see I Kings 2: 28-
34.
"' See, e.g., 1 Kings 2:28-34; Blakesley, The Practice of Extradition from Antiquity to Mod-
ern France and the United States: A Brief History, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 39, 46-47(1981). Expiation, rest and happiness for the sinner as well as the society had to be obtained
through the soul-purging punishment of the wrongdoer or his proxy. CODE OF MANU, Bk.
VII: 18: 23-24; Bk. VIII; see I Kings 2: 28-34.
" Blakesly, supra note 52, at 46-47.
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Middle Ages, described brilliantly by Michel Foucault.5 4 The symbol of
the person condemned to be "expiated" for attempted regicide or parri-
cide was the symmetrical, inverted figure of the king, like the playing
card king. The king on top represented total, absolute power over his peo-
ple. He was omnipotent.
Naturally, the omnipotent king had control of life and death over his
subjects. Indeed, he had power over their very souls. Thus, one who
would challenge that power, the traitor who had attempted regicide (or
parricide-an analogue of regicide), had to be symbolized to the people as
the opposite. The person who attempted regicide had no power. Indeed,
that person had to be shown to lack even the power to die; the king had
power over that person's very soul. In fact, the people's soul was born of
the punishment applicable to them. Thus, it followed that the traitor
must die a thousand deaths. It would not do simply to execute her. The
executioner, therefore, was to take that person to the brink of death by
torture, but bring her back again. This process was to be repeated a thou-
sand times. Finally, the individual was "allowed" to die when it suited the
king. The inverted king was a strong symbol of the power held by the
monarchy. Terror and power were joined in a very significant and hor-
rificly symbolic way.
Of course, revolution eventually ensued. Tactics of terror learned
from their masters were used in the French Revolution and the Reign of
Terror that followed. Some violence is justified in certain circumstances.
For example, some violence was justified in rebellion and revolution to
escape oppression. John Stuart Mill wrote: [P]olitical liberties or rights
which it was to be regarded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe...
specified resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable."5"
Thus, revolution and related violence have been seen as culminations
of the Enlightenment philosophy and have been considered justified, even
noble. Violence and terror against innocents, however, is not included.
The French learned too well from the Ancien R~gime. The Revolu-
tion utilized similar attitudes about power and terror to accomplish its
ends. It moved from revolution to the "Reign of Terror." Murder was
murder and terror was terror, no matter how it was rhetorically glorified
at the time. Madame DaFarge in A Tale of Two Cities 6 is an interesting
literary symbol of the concept. She certainly had good reason to wish to
avenge herself and the French people. She registered all who would be
executed to avenge and "free" the French people. Once the wave of vio-
lence and concomitant power took hold, they consumed her and she em-
04 M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 11-13, 28-30 (A. Sheri-
dan trans. 1979).
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 2 (1947).
56 C. DICKENS, A TALE OF Two CITIES (Penguin Classics ed. 1986).
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bodied them. Similarly, in Anatole France's Les Dieux Ont Soif, 57
Evariste Gamelin a sensitive artist interested in rectifying injustice, be-
came a paranoid monster, consumed with the need and desire to execute
all who might have been connected with the Ancien Regime. When vio-
lence exploded with its brutal fury against those who "represented" or
"symbolized" the enemy, it consumed those who wielded it as well. Right-
ing wrongs exploded with ferocious and relentless intensity into violence
against not only those who did evil and violence, but eventually against
those who were viewed as a symbol of that evil. Thus, this violence, con-
sumed the good that prompted it. It consumed even its own. Gamelin,
who is finally decapitated by his beloved Guillotine, enunciated the point:
Until recently it was necessary to seek out the guilty to try to uncover them
in their retreats and to wrench confessions from them. Today it is no longer
a hunt with packs of hounds, no longer the pursuit of a timid prey. From all
sides the victims surrender themselves. Nobles, virgins, soldiers, prostitutes
flock to the Tribunal to extract their delayed condemnations from thejudges, claiming death as a right, which they are eager to savor. Today we
seem no different. 8
Whenever violence is applied to strike down innocents, as opposed to
combatants or their leaders, it is murder, even if rhetorically glorified at
the time. Such is the movement from revolution to the Reign of Terror.
The masters of revolutionary violence became terroristic murderers. Vio-
lence against innocents for whatever end, however glorified, is immoral
and criminal. It was immoral and criminal when perpetrated by the
"Ancien Regime" and it was immoral and criminal when perpetrated by
the "directorat." It is immoral and criminal when perpetrated today by
those claiming to defend democracy, to defend against oppression or to
promote "national liberation."
V. "MODERN" MOTIVATIONS AND PREDISPOSITIONS
Every faction in our pretended, modern world attempts to justify
killing or maiming innocents in much the same pernicious and symbolic
way. This willful or wanton violence against innocents is used to obtain,
maintain or to destroy power. It is terrorism.
Sometimes, the terrorist is motivated by the fundamentalist vision of
:7 A. FRANCE, LEs DiEux ONT Son? (Norwood ed. 1978).
'5 Id. at 198. I use Les Dieux ont Soif and A Tale of Two Cities in my Comparative Crimi-
nal Law Course, to present the role of ideology and morality in the development of the
criminal law. I use Camus, l'Etranger and his essay, Reflections on the Guillotine, to show
their application. This particular quotation is well fit to indicate the impact violence against
relative innocents has on the actor. It was brought to my attention in a paper, Revolutionary
Justice, unpublished (May 18, 1987), done for that course by Stephanie Brown, a student at
the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law.
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having the truth and, therefore, the obligation to apply any means, in-
cluding violence against innocents and self-destruction, to enunciate, es-
tablish and maintain the truth on earth. This attitude is built upon a
zealot's vision of the world of "good order" he or she will establish.
Other times, it is simply the so-called revolutionary, looking to de-
stroy the status quo with terror. This may include the nihilist, who has an
almost metaphysical vision of the need to destroy. Often the revolution-
ary practices a pretend nihilism, for terrorism is simply his or her way of
gaining power and becoming a statist functionary who can use terror to
maintain power.
A. The "Modern" Political Realist
Political and legal theoreticians have played a role, as well. The so-
called "realist" vision of law as the command of the sovereign and the use
of the concept of "necessity" to eliminate terrorism and communism have
led to depredation and the break-down of any semblance of legal order
based on protection of the individual and human rights. 9
Often both the revolutionary and his opponent are so-called modern
political "realists." The "realist" has disdain for fundamentalist zeal, but
will still use terror against innocents, if "necessary" and "effective." The
writings and conduct of Machiavelli, Kissinger, Brezezinski, Kennon, and
McNamara, Lenin, Frantz Fanon, Sartre, Lin Piao, and Mao are exam-
ples. The so-called realist harbours no normative limits on violence and,
thus, accepts unquestioningly that the end justifies the means. There are
limits, to be sure, but they are "realist limits." The realist recognizes that
one must be sure that the end is achievable and that the means are neces-
sary to the achievement of that end."
This form of "realism" promotes terrorism. Thomas Merton teaches
that "modern" society's vision and justification, both "realist" and "fun-
damentalist," of existence is actually a "derisory, almost satanic repudia-
tion of that existence. What society [revolutionary or status quo]
preaches as 'the good life' is in fact a systematically organized way of
death, not only because it is saturated with what psychologists call an
unconscious death wish, but because it actually rests on death. It is built
on the death of the nonconformist, the alien, the odd ball, the enemy, the
criminal. It is based on war, on imprisonment, on punitive methods which
include not only mental and physical torture but, above all, the death
penalty."6 1
19 R. FALK, supra note 17, at 87-94.
60 The "terrorist mindset" and its application, with all its frightening implications to both
the revolutionary and status quo sides, is developed in R. FALK, supra note 17, at ch. V.
11 T. MERTON supra note 39, at 197-98.
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B. Terrorism and Notions of Total War
Terrorism and "total" war are parallel concepts in the sense that
they have parallel results and rationales.2 In total war, where innocent
civilians are used as targets for military victory, war becomes quintessen-
tially criminal terrorism. Thus, it was considered acceptable to drop the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which left "[p]eople in rags of
hanging skin, wandering about and lamenting aloud the dead bodies." 3
This horrible tragedy was designed to terrorize the population and leader-
ship of Japan so that they would quit the war more quickly. Innocent
persons in these undefended cities were chosen so that the shock would
have sufficient impact.
Sadly, today, and perhaps back then too, the concept of the inevita-
bility of total war has pervaded all political and military theory and prac-
tice. When total war was accepted as a possibility, it became so ingrained
in the consciousness of all powers that it pervaded all of our relational
thought processes.6
4
Consider the fearsome view of the world held by much of its inhabi-
tants. On each side of essentially every world issue, people believe they
have absolute right on their side. Each side applies absolutist terminology
and belief. Each side believes that its very existence is threatened by its
enemies. Each side believes that total war is appropriate and may be nec-
essary for survival. Each side accepts the possibility of its own annihila-
tion. Thus, revolutionaries see the state as absolute evil to which absolute
destructive power may be applied. The state sees the revolutionary as ab-
solute evil to which it may apply absolute power. 5 Is it any wonder that
terrorism is the mode of warfare and even politics today?
The tragedy is that terrorism has permeated orthodox military strat-
egy-or perhaps has grown naturally out of that strategy. Nearly every
nation's basic political and military strategic planning is based on this
dangerously flawed vision of ourselves and the world. With the current
availability of absolute destructive power we must figure a better way to
envision the world and each other.
C. Self-Centered, Self-Justified, and Self-Serving Abuse of Self-De-
fense
It was argued by the Reagan Administration that it is "justifiable
02 This interconnection of war and terrorism is developed in R. FALK, supra note 17, at 76,
90-93.
63 Falk, The Shimoda Case: A Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks Upon Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 759, 761 (1965).
"' Id.; R. FALK, supra note 17, at 90-94.
5 See generally R. FALK, supra note 17.
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self-defense to apply military force to preempt anticipated terroristic ac-
tivity or to retaliate against terrorists or against states which support ter-
rorism by harboring, financing, or training terrorists. In addition, abduc-
tion of "terrorists" from abroad is argued also to be "justifiable self-
defense." 6 From this point of view, the bombing of Tripoli, including the
targeting of Qaddafi and his family, was "self-defense."67
Moreover, it was argued that the only judge of the justification in
such a situation is the administration itself. A decision to take such mea-
sures of "self-justified self-defense" is per se legal. No other branch of
government, and certainly no other nation or institution, may question
it.68
One obvious practical danger of this attitude of self-justification is
that other nations or groups may utilize it as well. Could the Soviet
Union "justify" a pre-emptive strike against the United States? Can
groups that consider themselves violated by the United States "justify"
similar conduct? Why not? If self-justification is elevated to the level of
legality, there is no rule of law in any crucial context. 9
Unfortunately, self justification is a popular tactic among the govern-
ments of the world, as well as among the rebels and revolutionary leader-
ship. Thus, a significant danger of self-justifying self-defense is that it
allows all nations or groups to profess the legality of any act they wish to
commit "in self-defense." If one has the power to succeed, one is justi-
fied.70 It is fearsome that this is the view of international law and self-
defense held by most of the leaders in the world, including our own. An-
other concern is the impact that a self-defining vision of self-defense
might have on our domestic constitutional order. It assumes a dangerous
perception of the separation of powers 7
Self-justified self-defense is strikingly similar to Soviet and ancient
e In 1986, President Reagan authorized the C.I.A. to abduct suspected terrorists in other
countries and to bring them to the United States for trial. Walcott & Pastor, Reagan Ruling
to Let C.I.A. Kidnap Terrorists Overseas Is Disclosed, Wall St. J. Feb. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6;
Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States: Issues of Interna-
tional and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L L. J. 1 (1988).
17 Hersch, "Target Qaddafi," N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, (Magazine), at 17; R. FALK, supra
note 17, at 123, 173, 178 (100 civilian casualties), and 198, n.1.
" See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at Al, col. 4; id. Jan 28, 1986, at A2, col. 4 (Abraham
Sofaer, Legal Adviser to Department of State, defends legality of abduction of terrorists).
But see, Murphy, The Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat International Ter-
rorism, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 35, 83-84 (suggesting that except in rare occasions of
anarchy, abductions would be illegal).
" Schachter, Self-Judging Self Defence, 19 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 121, 122 (1987) (noting
danger of allowing self-justification in self defence to be rule of law).
70 Id.
71 See Blakesley, Terrorism, Law and Our Constitutional Order, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 471,
503-04 (1989).
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German notions of "necessary defense." The ancient German notions of
das Recht and "necessary defense" (Notwehr)," and the Soviet vision
(neobxodimaja oborona)73 provide that any right or defendable interest,
from life to personal honor, receive the same degree of protection and
privilege. The only question is whether a right or interest is threatened;
for if it is, the good social order is injured or threatened, and necessary
defense is triggered. Whatever force is necessary to prevent the invasion
of the right or interest-the destruction of "good order"-is justified.74
In both the Soviet and German conceptualization of "necessary de-
fence," the notions of "legal order" (die Rechtordnung) and social dan-
gerousness (protivopravnost) identify "necessary defense" with protec-
tion of the legal order in its entirety. 75 Thus, attacks on the Sudetenland
and Poland at the beginning of World War II and the elimination of
many perceived "threats" to the legal order-the Jewish population,
"deviates," insane or other "mental deficients" in Germany, or similar en-
emies of the State in Stalinist U.S.S.R.-were justified in the name of the
self-justified "necessary defense." The policy of self-justified self defense
and the cliche, "one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter," are
analogous to the increasingly popular view among many private individu-
als that because many criminals are not caught or punished, there is no
effective criminal law, and resort to "vigilante justice" is justified. When
this mind-set prevails, power alone becomes the keystone of relations.
Substantive and procedural constitutional protections are cast aside.
Most solutions to terrorism assume that terrorism is only a tactic of
"the enemy." The solution, therefore, is to eliminate the enemy. Power is
accepted as the only medium of international relations. Obviously, when
the leaders of all camps maintain this stance, terrorism is not going to
diminish. The critics conclude, therefore, that there is no solution to the
problem of terrorism.
VI. ESCAPING THE CYCLE
We must escape this cycle. No end justifies oppression or violence
against innocents. We must condemn it. It violates domestic and interna-
tional law. The best ways to combat terrorism are to eliminate the op-
pression and depredation which are at its root and to oppose terroristic
activity by our own governments, even when euphemized as anti-terror-
ism. Domestic and international law provide the means to combat both
72 See Strafgestzbuch § 53 [hereinafter StGB].
" Ugolovnyj Kodeks R.S.F.S.R. § 13.
7' See Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative
Criminal Theory, in STUD. COMP. CrM. L. 123-127 (E. Wise & G. Mueller eds. 1975).
"' Id. at 140.
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aspects of terrorism; they provide a means to pressure perpetrators of op-
pression and to prosecute and punish all violence against innocents
whether its goal is to intimidate a population or group, to trigger anarchy,
or promote other military, political, ideological, or religious ends.
Elsewhere, I have developed a neutral definition of criminal terror-
ism. 76 Such a definition must apply to every group or nation, regardless of
ideology.7 7 The trick is accepting the application of the definition when
one's own leaders or friends commit acts within its scope. The definition
must allow us to determine exactly what type of violence we reject. We
must deplore that conduct and adopt a consistent policy that condemns
it. We must extradite, prosecute and punish its perpetrators, whoever
they are.
Terrorism is political violence aimed at or wantonly impacting on in-
nocent civilians. It holds no justification or excuse. It is political violence
without the restraint of international law or morality.78 It is a means to
obtain or promote some political, military, ideological (including anarchy
or nihilism), or religious end. It is no mystery. The criteria for terrorism
are what is done (was it violence designed to achieve a political or mili-
tary or philosophical end?) and against whom (was it done to non-com-
batants or innocents?). Terrorist conduct is condemned as criminal by
every nation of the world. It is criminal and immoral, whether ostensibly
committed in the name of democracy, communism, anti-communism, na-
tional liberation, self-determination, God, or whatever other piety. Each
of us must personally choose to condemn all terrorism. If we support our
own terrorism while condemning that of our "enemies," we will only reap
more terrorism and strengthen the deadly grip that it has on us and the
world.79
" See Blakesley, supra note 71, at 472-90. Other commentators have correctly denominated
terrorism against individuals (I would say innocents) as human rights violations. See, e.g.,
Randall, Federal Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 351
n.12 (1988) (citing Paust, The Link Between Human Rights and Terrorism and Its Impli-
cations for the Law of State Responsibility, 11 HASTNGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 41 (1987)).
In addition, case law supports my definition of terrorism. See, e.g., Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540-43 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (official torture, prolonged arbitrary detention,
summary execution, and causing disappearances violate customary international law). For
several United Nations documents that condemn hijacking and other forms of terrorism, see
Randall, supra, at 351 n.12.
77 See Blakesley, supra note 71, at 481.
71 R. FALK, supra note 17, at 19; Blakesley, supra note 71, at 472-488.
71 See Blakesley, supra note 71, at 472-488. See generally Stuesser, Active Defense: State
Military Response to International Terrorism., 17 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1987) ("Unlawful
use of force only encourages further illegal force. Breach invites counterbreach."); Comment,
Controlling International Terrorism: An Analysis of Unilateral Force and Proposals for
Multilateral Cooperation, 8 U. TOL. L. REV. 209, 242 (1976) ("Indeed, for most terrorist acts,
the acts themselves-aside from questions of political motivation-are precisely those
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Unfortunately, the propagandistic appropriation of the term terror-
ism has made it nearly impossible to combat terrorism. People are ideo-
logically opposed to the notion that terrorism is a phenomenon displayed
in every camp, including their own. Professor Richard Falk, in his book,
Revolutionaries and Functionaries,o applies theatrical imagery to clarify
the ugly phenomenon of terrorism that has become frightening world the-
atre of death. Drawing from Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici's The Moro
Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama, Falk notes that the media,
government leaders, leaders of revolutionary groups, and figures of politi-
cal, moral, and religious authority perceive and propound terroristic
events (for that matter, perhaps all significant events) in a melodramatic
idiom. Events are interpreted in a good versus evil dichotomy. Ambiguity
is non-existent and "we," the "good," must triumph over "them," the
"evil." The danger is self-evident; each side feels this way. As a palliative
to this delusional and dangerous tendency, Professor Falk counterpoises
the opposing theatrical idiom of tragedy as the better vision of world
events and world conflicts. Tragedy provides understanding and, through
suffering and forgiveness, eventual transformation and transcendence."
This metaphor runs throughout the work. It provides a useful and prag-
matic tool for understanding the terrorist dilemma. It is no less practical
than a proper and appropriate theory is necessary to a correct prognosis
of a disease or to the resolution of a scientific conundrum.
The simple platitude: "one person's terrorist is another's freedom
fighter," while bandied about and sometimes taken seriously, is a mani-
festation of the problem. It certainly misses the point. The issue is
whether certain conduct, whether perpetrated by governmental officials,
soldiers, police, freedom fighters, insurgents in a civil war, or dissidents, is
criminal. There are freedom fighters who become criminal terrorists. It
depends on what they do and to whom they do it.
Sartre was correct, but incomplete, in aphorizing, "once begun, [a
war of national liberation] is a war that gives no quarter."82 Today, no
war does. Killing in war, sadly, is deemed by nations and other groups to
be justifiable or acceptable. Wars of any kind are, by definition, murder-
ously violent. They are akin to murder and probably turn many of the
combatants on both sides into victims, executioners, or both. 3 Some con-
duct, however, is not justifiable or acceptable even within war and, thus, a
crimes (for example, homicide and kidnapping) which are universally recognized as morally
and legally unacceptable").
" See R. FALK, supra note 17, at 140 (propagandistic appropriation of law).
"' See R. FALK, supra note 17, at 86-87.
82 Sartre, supra note 45, at 21.
" See A. CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMs NOR EXECUTIONERS 27 (D. MacDonald trans. 1972); E.
REMARQUE, ALL QUIET ON THE WESTERN FRONT (1929).
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fortiori, is inexcusable during times of relative peace. A fight for survival,
or even one for gaining or retaining power, may cause people to do un-
speakable things, but we do not have to justify or even accommodate such
behavior. Thus, even if killing innocents is deemed effective to promote
an end that the killers consider good-even if it actually is an efficient
means to intimidate a government or dissident group, or to render a pop-
ulation insecure-it is not morally justified or legal. The claim of the op-
pressed that a child is the enemy, because she will inherit the benefits of
the oppressors or because she will grow into an attacker, is unacceptable,
just as it is unacceptable to oppress or to allow other governments or
other groups to oppress.
Moreover, para-military or other combatant forces have no justifica-
tion to hole themselves up and to use innocent non-combatant civilians as
shields. This is a form of oppression or terrorism. Similarly, it is not ac-
ceptable*-it is criminal terrorism-to bomb, gas, or starve villages, be-
cause one wishes to undermine confidence in the nation's leader in order
to prompt a coup d'etat, or because one believes that some enemy or
"terrorist" forces may be hiding or interspersed therein. Unfortunately,
governments and revolutionaries alike, as well as most international law
jurists and commentators, have forgotten essential and basic criminal law.
We face such danger today that we must find a way to remind our-
selves that the world is made up of human beings and that the law recog-
nizes this. Then, we must ensure that the world is controlled by the rule
of law and morality, not raw power. This was Albert Camus' vision, taken
up by Thomas Merton and Richard Falk. 4 We can transcend ourselves
and our current leaders' view of the world to establish peace maintained
by government through law and morality. It is necessary first, however, to
recognize that neither the revolutionaries nor the advocates of the status
quo are currently living by law or morality. We are controlled by a perva-
sive terroristic mindset. If we cannot see this, we cannot transcend it and
we are doomed to live in or destroy the world in a terroristic tragedy.
The conduct described herein and in my other articles s" illustrates
that terrorism poses a vicious threat to human dignity. There is a com-
mon core of values that condemns criminal terroristic conduct. This con-
duct is to be condemned, whether it emanates from states against inhabi-
84 This is one of the essential themes of Falk's Revolutionaries and Functionaries. I have
been working on similar thoughts over the years and have tried herein both to explore this
theme and to ruminate on its depths and moral-legal implications.
8 My other articles on the theme of terrorism include: Terrorism, Law and Our Constitu-
tional Order, 60 U. Colo. L. Rev. 471 (1989); Terrorism and the Constitution, 27 B.Y.U.
STUDIES 197 (1987); Jurisdiction as Protection Against Terrorism, 19 U. CONN. L. REV. 895
(1987); An Essay on the Executive Branch Attempts to Eviscerate the Separation of Pow-
ers, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 451; and The Evisceration of the Political Offence Exception to
Extradition, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL. 109 (1986).
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tants of their own territory, in violation of human rights law, or against
noncombatants outside the state. It is criminal even when perpetrated by
groups of insurgents struggling for independence or freedom from oppres-
sion. I am not arguing for punishment of "states," "nations" or "groups"
for what has been called "state-terrorism," although such terrorism cer-
tainly exists. Individuals, even when functioning in their official govern-
mental capacity, are subject to the rule of law and may be punished for
committing or aiding and abetting criminal terrorism as defined herein.
Criminal tactics in the name of freedom or anti-terrorism are criminal
nonetheless, notwithstanding their rhetorically lofty purpose. The crimi-
nality of the conduct is determined by customary and other international
law and by domestic criminal law. Evidence of its universal condemnation
is found in the complex of international treaties and domestic substantive
criminal law, arising to the level of general principle.
The excuses and reasons given by apologists for governments, ter-
rorists and counter-terrorists alike ring frighteningly familiar. They
should remind us of Milton's poignant warning: "So spake the Fiend, and
with necessity, The Tyrant's plea, excused his devilish deeds. 8 6
We have seen violence justified in self-defense or when it occurs in
revolution or breaking the yoke of oppression. Ideologists suggest, either
by word or deed, that violence against innocent civilians is justified and
legal when committed for a just cause. Both the substantive criminal law
model and the law of war model condemn willful or wanton violence
against innocents. While violence may sometimes be justified, violence
against innocents is not. One is not justified to slit a weaker person's
throat and to drink his blood or eat his flesh on the ground that one will
starve otherwise. s 7 Nor does it include killing innocents to benefit, or even
protect, the nation or group. Self-defense does not comprehend the killing
of innocents (those not in a mode of attack upon us), nor the use of in-
"8 J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. 4, lines 393-94; see also J. CONRAD, LORD JIM 86, 95, 357,
367 (1924) (to save his own life, captain abandoned ship without telling passengers); J. CON-
RAD, HEART OF DARKNESS, in COMPLETE WORKS (1926); Boyer, Crime, Cannibalism and Jo-
seph Conrad: The Influence of Regina v. Dudley & Stevens on Lord Jim, 20 Loy. L.A.L.
REv. 9 (1986).
8 Regina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (sailors who, out of "necessity," killed
a shipmate for food were sentenced to be hanged, but were later reprieved). Some have
suggested that the German substantive criminal law would justify this conduct. See Franck
& Scott G. Senecal, Porfiry's Proposition: Legitimacy and Terrorism, 20 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 195, at 201-202 (1987). But it would not. It is true that the German vision of neces-
sity as an excuse may excuse the conduct, recognizing it to be wrong or against the social
order (rechtswidrig) but note culpable (Schuld). This notion recognizes that given some
extreme pressures of circumstances, people may commit rechtswidrig acts, punishment for
which will be forgone because society understands. This is not a justification in the least;
nor is it self defense. See Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 356
(1987); Fletcher, supra note 74.
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nocents as a means of self-preservation. A nation may not justifiably
starve, attack and destroy, or otherwise oppress a group or nation, inside
or outside its borders, to. benefit the majority of the population or its
power elite. Any group that adopts such a tactic-who oppresses or com-
mits terror-violence, or promotes or condones its use, even in the name of
God, communism, democracy, or whatever piety-has no room to com-
plain about the other side doing the same. Condemnation of terrorism by
those who either use it or condone its use is hollow.
Terrorism committed by a group against a nation or its nationals
should not be an excuse to commit the same against innocents of that
group. We should be beyond the blood-feud mentality of using innocent
noncombatant members of our enemies' population as proxies for our
vengeance or as tools for promoting our interests through intimidation.
To the contrary, acceptance of the policy that one person's terrorist is
another's freedom fighter is acquiescing to the notion that there is no rule
of law in the international arena. Once one so acquiesces, he has no re-
course to the rule of law.
Finally, Thomas Merton used the Trojan War to illustrate the horri-
ble silliness of war. His condemnation applies just as well to criminal
terrorism:
The only one, Greek or Trojan, who had any interest in Helen was Paris. No
one, Greek or Trojan, was fighting for Helen, but for the "real issue" which
Helen symbolized. Unfortunately, there was no real issue at all for her to
symbolize. Both armies, in this war, which is the type of all wars, were fight-
ing in a moral void, motivated by symbols without content, which in the
case of the Homeric heros took the form of gods and myths.8
This was not so bad for the Greeks, because their myths limited them.
For us, our myths are absolute and are integral with total war and terror-
ism. Our myths "penetrate the whole realm of political, social, and ethical
thought."8 9 We go to war or we condone or promote our own govern-
ment's or group's criminal terrorism "because of 'secret plots' and sinister
combinations, because of political slogans elevated to the dignity of meta-
physical absolutes." 90 These have no content. "We seek to impart content
to them by destroying other men who believe in enemy-words."
'91 Yet,
this is equally without content.
Simone Weill and Thomas Merton were not far off in their belief
that the monster, "the great beast," is the urge to collective power, "the
88 T. MERTON, The Answer of Minerva: Pacifism and Resistance in Simone Weil, THE
LITERARARY ESSAYS OF THOMAS MERTON 134, 137 (1981).
89 Id.
90 Id.
81 Id. at 138.
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grimmest of all the social realities of our time." ' This lust for power is
masked by the symbols of "nationalism, of capitalism, communism, fas-
cism, racism,"9s and, I would add, fundamentalism, anti-terrorism, self-
determination, and even democracy. 4 Even national security, which is "a
chimerical state of things in which one would keep for oneself alone the
power to make war while all other countries would be unable to do so.....
We must individually explode the myth and defeat the great beast. If
terrorism is to be overcome, we must heal the plague that is rotting our
souls and ensure that our leaders follow suit.
92 Id.
93 Id.
" See Ecclesiastes, 1: 2; 12:8 (noting that "everything is vanity [and evil] if abused" and all
will pass away).
" T. MERTON, supra note 88, at 139, (quoting S. Weil).
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